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The Reasonable Necessary for the Implement of
Telecommunications Interception
and Access Laws
NAzzAL M. KIsswANI*

Abstract
As telecommunications technology and telecommunications technology-related crime become increasingly complex and sophisticated,law enforcement authoritiesincreasingly seek to exercise effective powers in relation to telecommunications interception and access for the purpose of criminal
investigations and maintenance of nationalsecurity. In addition, lawful interception and the way
it is performed have played an important role in the effectiveness of monitoringcommunications.
Telecommunications interceptionand access law should also place a great deal of importance on the
privacy of the individual, as well as the needs of national security, criminal investigation,
counterterrorismefforts, and economic growth. The author concludes that telecommunications interception accepts the idea of "balancing" individualprivacy with allowing law enforcement agencies to obtain access to such telecommunicationsfor nationaland public security purposes.

Keywords: interception law, national security, combat terrorism, criminal investigation,
evidence, economic growth, and access to communication.
I.

Introduction

This paper will look at the national and global issues that drive the need for telecommunications interception activity in these areas, and examine the broader socio-politico and
economic context surrounding the topic. Specifically, the following issues will be analyzed, with reference to the historical development, economies, and regulatory structures
of the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Jordan:
* National security and the role of telecommunications interception in protecting
the safety of a country's institutions and citizens.
* Terrorism and the need for coordinated national and multinational efforts to combat terrorism using telecommunications interception and access. This section also
examines the delicate balancing act between civil liberties versus the effective conduct of national security and anti-terrorist activities.
Nazzal M. Kisswani, College of Law, Qatar University, Doha - Qatar. Email: nkisswani@qu.edu.qa.
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* The role of telecommunications interception in law enforcement in helping to detect criminal activity and the use of interception and access material as evidence in
criminal prosecutions.
* The importance of effective telecommunications interception and access regulatory structures to safeguard economic development, without hindering the free
conduct of business at the same time.
* The importance of interception activity, not only to gather information regarding
a whole range of criminal and terrorist activity, but also the need for additional
safeguards where the global electronic networks themselves upon which economic
activity depends are now a target for "cyber" criminal and terrorist attacks.
These topics provide the complex environment that legislators and policy makers must
navigate in developing and refining regulatory frameworks for telecommunications.
H.

National Security

The use of telecommunications interception to help safeguard national security has a
long history dating back to the early 20th Century, particularly during the World War H
era. Cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States laid the groundwork for many of the national security interception approaches that provided an early
generation of the structures in place today. Over the years, cooperative efforts among the
United Kingdom and other countries in the European Union produced the development
of an extensive automated monitoring program, known as the ECHELON project, to
track phone calls, faxes, emails, and telex messages around the globe. Vestiges of the
ECHELON system of multinational cooperation still exist today,' even though they are
vastly modified, modernized, and regulated.
Traditionally, national security concerns encompassed things like espionage, military
strength and weapons (particularly nuclear weapons), and other "Cold War" issues, as well
as activity during active wartime to intercept and decrypt enemy transmissions for strategic advantage. However, in recent decades national security priorities have shifted, particularly in the era since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. The new
focus is on anti-terrorism activities. The role and need for telecommunications interception as part of anti-terrorism programs specifically is discussed in detail in Section III.
This section will examine the more general issues and approaches of telecommunications
interception and access as a tool for protecting national security interests, and the delicate
balancing act that must be maintained to preserve the civil liberties and personal security
that the citizens of these nations expect (and, that many would argue, make theirs a nation
worth protecting to begin with).
A.

CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY & INTERCEPTION APPROACHES

It is a broadly held principle of democratic societies that individuals have unique rights
as citizens. Among those rights is a certain level of protection from unwarranted monitor1. SeeReport of the Temporary Commission on the ECHELON Interception System on the Existence of
a Global System for the Interception of Private and Commercial Communications, EUR. PARL. Doc. A50264 (2001).

VOL. 45, NO. 3

THE REASONABLE NECESSARY

859

ing, intrusion, and interference into their lives by governmental authorities. Accordingly,
modern democratic nations typically have, as part of their constitutional structures or legally recognized historical precedent, the principle that the personal communications of
an individual or a business are private and protected.
However, as Bazan puts it:
Electronic surveillance can provide vital information needed to identify those who are
acting or preparing to act against [a nation's] interests for the benefit of foreign powers, including those engaged in espionage, sabotage, or terrorist acts or who otherwise pose a threat to the nation or its citizens, and to uncover their plans or activities.
This information may not be readily uncovered by other investigative means. Thus,
surveillance can provide a valuable tool for protecting the security of the nation and
its citizens. However, this investigative technique, by its nature, can intrude into the
privacy of both the target of the surveillance and those with whom the target com2
municates. It also has the potential of chilling political discussion and lawful dissent.
Because of these concerns, democratic governments therefore typically hold that, as a
key principle, personal communications may not be intercepted except in the event of
specific, exceptional circumstances. Exceptions are generally recognized as being related
to criminal or unlawful activities, as determined by some competent authority (such as a
judge) who then allows a warrant to be issued. This warrant then gives law enforcement
or national security officers the right to conduct interception of the communications of an
individual within certain defined parameters. Although there are many different variations in regulatory structures from country to country, these essential principles, nevertheless, can be seen as the core of all developed interception regimes.
The Markle Foundation defined three key elements of national security in the electronic information age: "pre-emptive profiling, data warehousing, and agency interactivity." 3 In BAtain and in the United States, these roles are fulfilled by several domestic and

foreign security organizations. In Britain, the Security Service (MIS) serves a police function in its capacity as the domestic security agency, much like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) serves a police function in the United States. Similarly, these agencies are
accountable to domestic authorities: The Judiciary and the Department of Justice in the
United States and the Home office in the United Kingdom. In the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks on the United States, the FBI, though already responsible for conducting
international criminal investigations, broadened its activities to better support national
4
security investigation and detection by establishing a National Security Branch.
In Britain, the Secret Intelligence Service (M16) and the Government Communications
5
Headquarters (GCHQ) are overseen by the Foreign Office. There is also a Defense
6
Intelligence Staff that is part of the Ministry of Defense. Generally, M16 only performs
2. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCI SERV., RL 34279, THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED ISSUES 6 (2008).
3. JOANNA ENsum, MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE, DOMESTIC SECURITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:
AN OVERVIEW, in PROTECTING AMERICA'S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE: A REPORT OF THE
MARKLE FOUNDATION TASK FORCE 101, 101 (2002).
4. Michael B. Mukasy, NationalSecurity and the Rule ofLaw, 32 HAR.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 831, 834 (2009).
5. ENSUM, supra note 3, at 101.
6. Id.
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human intelligence gathering that occurs outside the United Kingdom, while M15 does
human intelligence gathering and technical intelligence collection within the borders of
the United Kingdom working together with law enforcement agencies. 7 GCHQ does
most technical intelligence collection outside the United Kingdom.8 All of these agencies
interact through a Joint Intelligence Committee, which as a part of the British Cabinet
reports short and long-term national security intelligence to the Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers.9
Britain does not have a central data analysis agency similar to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which gathers and analyzes intelligence information, including information collected via interception activity.1 0 The British system is criticized for producing
overly homogenized intelligence reports compared to the U.S. model where different
agencies and departments produce "competing assessments" that more fully illuminate all
sides of an issue."
However, the U.S. system, with the CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency (NSA)
acting sometimes in parallel, has also been criticized for a lack of cooperation and information sharing among agencies. Lack of integrated information has been blamed for
some national security oversights in recent years. Clearly, in an age where national security is heavily dependent on a nation's ability to gather and make use of vast amounts of
data and information (both intercepted data and publicly available data), striking a balance
between robust analysis and coordinated information sharing is the ideal solution.12
In Australia, national security is the prime responsibility of the Australian Security Information Organization (ASIO).13 ASIO's mandate extends to both "internal and external" threats, without the same foreign and domestic split that is seen in the U.S. and
British agency structures.14
Despite their differing agency structures, the common theme among all of these nations
is that the various agencies, while tasked with gathering and using intelligence for protecting the state and its citizens, are also all enjoined from gathering intelligence in a manner
that is unlawful or intrusive. Even when conducting the most secretive activities of interception, there must still be some authority (whether a confidential judicial tribunal or
review board) that maintains oversight to ensure that national security activities do not
override the boundaries of civil liberty and individual rights upon which these democracies are founded. For example, Australia has an Inspector-General of Intelligence and
Security whose sole task is to oversee ASIO and ensure that its activities are conducted
5
within the laws and constitutional requirements of the country.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 102.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. H.P. Lee, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation:New Mechanisms for Accountability, 38 Iwr. COMP.
LAw. Q. 890, 895 (1989).
14. Id. at 896.
15. Id. at 900.
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APPROACHES

Meanwhile, the meaning of "national security" has broadened significantly. As Omand
points out "the state has traditionally been the focus of foreign defence and security policies while national security has been about the protection of the state and its vital interests
from attack by other states."1 6 Now, the complexity and interconnectedness of global
economies, energy sources, supply chains, communications networks, and even climate
change, along with the increasing sophistication of criminal and antisocial activities, necessitates a broader view of what "national security" means. For example, in his 2006 U.S.
National Security Strategy statement, former U.S. President George W. Bush included
17
the activity of "diffusing regional conflicts" as a matter of national security, even if a
small regional conflict in some distant part of the world could not possibly be considered a
traditional military threat to the United States. Yet, in the vast interconnected socioeconomic and technological networks in which we live, destabilization in one region can
have a global impact.18
The rapid pace of technological change, in particular, presents a challenge for national
security and law enforcement agencies. Lloyd-Jones argues that communications technology and national security are converging ever more closely, necessitating a calibration
between technology and national security policies to a degree not required before.19
In fact, a new prefix has entered the lexicon in recent decades: "cyber"-as in cybercrime
and cyber-terrorism. Not only are criminals and terrorists making more sophisticated use
of electronic communications networks to conduct activity, but the financial systems, national infrastructure, and communications networks themselves have become targets for
criminal and terrorist activity, presenting a new national security threat.
The dual nature of this cyber-threat makes it doubly important for countries to have
effective and up-to-date interception and access regimes that allow them to respond adequately to the nature of these new electronic threats. Walden urges nations to undertake
inter-governmental harmonization initiatives addressing the suitability of the criminal
code, the adequacy of law enforcement powers to investigate cyberspace activities, and
greater transnational cooperation 20 to combat these threats. Walden goes on to distinguish three categories of cyber crime:
1) [C]omputer-related cybercrime, such as fraud and theft, where computers are simply the tools used" to commit traditional criminal acts;
2) "[C]ontent-based cybercrimes, such as criminal copyright infringement and child
pornography, where computer and communications technologies facilitate the distribution of illegal data"; and
16. SIR DAVID OMAND, INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.K. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 4 (2009), available at http://www.ippr.org/

images/media/files/publication/2011/05/National%2OSecurity%2OStrategyj1675.pdf.
17. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
(May 2010), http://www.strategicstudiesinStitute.army.mil/pdffiles/nss.pdf.

11

18. Id. at 2.
19. Susanne Lloyd-Jones, Where the Wild Things Are: Evolving Futuresof Communications Regulation in the
Current National Security Context, 14(2) PAC. JOURNALISM REv. 50, 50-51 (2008).
20. Ian Walden, Crime and Security in Cyberspace, 18(1) CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 51, 53 (2005).
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3) "[A]ctivities where the intention is to compromise the integrity, availability and
confidentiality of the computers and systems connected to the internet and the
21
data being processed on them, such as hacking and the distribution of viruses.
In response to the increasingly electronic nature of criminal and terrorist activity, more
interception attention has begun to shift towards the capabilities of large-scale data collection and analysis as a vital tool for protecting national security interests. This approach
uses techniques like pattern recognition and data mining to identify and extract meaning-

ful security information from large pools of data. This can be a powerful way not only to
gather evidence of criminal activity that has already occurred to capture the perpetrators,
but even to spot the signs of activity that is merely in the planning stage to prevent or
interrupt it before significant harm can be done. But the Markle Foundation task force
cautions that an overzealous approach to gathering and collecting data in a single repository is not actually likely to yield significant benefit. 22 Due to the widely dispersed nature
of the threats, the much greater manpower available when local and regional authorities
are involved, and the vast amount of publicly obtainable data that is already available and
not yet fully utilized there is no need to respond to modern threats with a vastly expanded
23
interception and access regime for mass data collection.
Additionally, a data-driven approach also presents several obvious red flags regarding
the gathering and use of an individual's personal information such as email communications, online transactions, and other data, and the constitutionality of such activities. How
are modern national security agencies to handle this sensitive data in a way that protects
both individual privacy and liberty while giving them a full arsenal of weapons against
national security threats?

IHI.

Combating Terrorism

In the wake of numerous terrorist attacks in the recent decade including the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, the use of interception activity to help combat
terrorism has increasingly come to the forefront of any discussion of telecommunications
interception and access.
International terrorism, as defined by Section 2331 of the United States Code includes:
activities that - (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any
State; (B) appear to be intended - (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii)
to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect
the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping . .. 24
Similarly, Australian law defines terrorism as:
21. Id. at 52.
22. ENSUM, supra note 3, at 101.

23. Id.
24. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(a)-(b) (West 2001).
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* An action or threat of action that causes serious physical harm or death to a person,
or endangers a person's life or involves serious risk to public health or safety, serious damage to property or serious interference with essential electronic systems;
and
* The action is done or threat is made with the intention of advancing a political,
religious or ideological cause and to coerce or influence by intimidation an Austra25
lian or foreign government or intimidate the public or a section of the public.
It is interesting to note that the Australian definition specifically mentions interference
with electronic systems, such as telecommunication networks. Both the United States and
Australia include the intention, or apparent intention, of the act as part of the definition.
For example, killing a person for the personal motives of jealousy or money is not terrorism, just murder.
Some of the most notable terrorist actions in the last decade that have spurred public
sentiment and legislative action driving the evolution of more aggressive anti-terrorism
interception activity include:
* 9/11-On September 11, 2001, four jetliners were hijacked and crashed into the
World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and rural
Pennsylvania, resulting in more than 3,000 deaths.
* Amman Hotel bombings in Jordan-On November 9, 2005, three hotels were attacked in the capital city of Amman, killing sixty people and injuring 115.
* London Transport bombings-On July 7, 2005, suicide bombers on the London
subways and buses killed fitfty-two people and injured more than 700.

* And many more, including: the Bali nightclub bombings in 2002, the Istanbul consulate truck bombs in 2003, and the Madrid train bombings in 2004.
Essentially, the world now recognizes that no nation is safe within its borders from
terrorist activity, thus the imperative to detect and prevent terrorists through all available
investigatory techniques has become a priority for national security agencies. This has
begun to alter the way various nations approach telecommunications interception as a
counter-terrorism measure. As Golder and Williams outline, a "first order response" to
the "war on terror" was "to make new laws." 26 Some nations already had counter-terrorism laws in place prior the 9/11 attacks, "which were then expanded after that date.
Others gained new regimes enacted, often with great haste, because the events of that day
were seen as requiring swift and strong action on the part of national legislatures." 27 The
next section examines the post-9/11 regulatory environment in several key nations.

A.

CuRRENT NATIONAL SECURITY INTERCEPTION APPROACHES

Many of the modern regulatory regimes' key anti-terrorism provisions were enacted in
response to 9/11 and other terrorist acts, and include the ability of law enforcement or
25. CriminalCode Act 1995 (Cth), amended by Security LegislationAmendment (Terrorirm)Act 2002 (Cth) pt
5.3 div 100 s 2 (Austl.).
26. Ben Golder & George Williams, Balancing NationalSecurity and Human Rights: Assessing the Legal Response of Common Law Nations to the Threat of Terrorism, 8(1) J. Conr. PoL'Y ANALYsIS 43, 43 (2006).
27. Id.
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national security agencies to detain and question suspected or suspicious individuals regarding potential terrorist activities, the ability to deny entry into the country to individuals who are suspected threats, deport individuals, and other various protective activities.
Some of these activities (for example, the extensive detention of terrorism suspects by the
United States at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base) have come under fire for breaching principles of civil liberty and due process of law. These matters provide an interesting counterpoint for discussion of the issue of telecommunications interception and data access but
will not be addressed in great detail.
1. United States
The most notable and far-reaching regulatory response to terrorism has been in the
United States with the Patriot Act and Foreign Intelligence Security Act (FISA). The
National Security Agency's (NSA) secret wiretapping program for monitoring communications of U.S. citizens was severely criticized as a breach of civil liberties and an overreaction to the terrorism threat, and has been modified (although not abolished) subsequently
by FISA that at least incorporates oversight of these activities by a special court.
The primary domestic legislation related to counter-terrorism is the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, known as the USA Patriot Act of 2001. In addition to many broad
law enforcement powers that were incorporated in the Patriot Act, the Act "was particularly significant in broadening the scope of existing surveillance powers to apply to the full
range of terrorism-related crimes, including chemical-weapons offences, the use of weap28
ons of mass destruction, killing Americans abroad and terrorism financing." U.S. authorities have "the power to conduct searches and seizures; to intercept wire, oral and
electronic communications; to demand access to stored communications and communications records; to install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices; and to issue
29
administrative subpoenas including those in the form of "national security letters."
2. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 (RIPA)30
regulates most forms of surveillance and the interception of communications and provides
somewhat less latitude for investigators than the laws of the United States. RIPA was
enacted "to update the laws on the interception of communications and brings them into
line with technological advances. The RIPA was also enacted in anticipation of the effects
of the Human Rights Act 1998 . . . and in response to a number of adverse rulings from
3
the European Court of Human Rights." The specific provisions of RIPA are discussed
in detail in section IV.
28. JACK STRAW, U.K FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, COUNTER-TERRORISM LEGISLATION
AND PRACTICE: A SURVEY OF SELECTED COUNTRIEs 34 (2005), http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2005/10/12/foreignterrorlawl.pdf.
29. CLARE FEIKERT & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL 33726, ANTI-TERRORISM AuTHORITY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES 14 (2006).

30. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, §§ 1-2 (Eng.).
31. FEIKERT & DOYLE, supra note 29.
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3. Australia
The most notable post-9/11 legislation in Australia was the Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Act of 2002 (TI Act), which permits law enforcement
agencies to seek telecommunications interception warrants in connection with their investigation of terrorism offenses. Essentially, the TI Act expands the capabilities of law enforcement agencies under ASIO.32 Although the government "already had extensive
powers, by warrant, to capture telephonic, postal and computer communications, it was
given power to seek warrants to question (and if necessary to ensure the questioning
power is effective, to detain) where there were reasonable grounds"33 for believing that
surveillance was necessary and the information could not be reasonably obtained through
other means.
The TI Act was again amended in 2006 as the TIA Act. The subsequent set of amendments are held forth, by some authorities, as a way to "balance" the civil libertarian concerns of the TI Act, placing Australia in the forefront of legislative developments. Others
fear that the 2006 amendments enhance interception capabilities without effectively securing greater privacy protection for citizens.34
4. Jordan

The nation of Jordan has also responded to the threats of terrorism with regulatory
structures and dedicated intelligence and military resources, and is prepared to be "an
integral part of the international system to face terrorism. Jordan has consistently expressed its condemnation of all forms of terrorism and stands ready to cooperate with the
international community" 35 in the detection and prevention of terrorism. Jordan's strategic geographical location in the Middle East also places it in position to be particularly
sensitive to the many aspects of terrorist activity and aware of means to'effectively detect
and combat it. For example, the country is in prime position to conduct surveillance and
interception of communications flowing in and out of terrorist cells and organizations that
36
take refuge in neighboring states such as Iraq.
Thus far, Jordan has committed to international cooperation on anti-terrorist activities,
"accomplished through the use of intelligence, using appropriate means of tracking and
prosecution, activating early warning systems, the exchange of information through follow-up of everyone who has links to any terrorist group in other countries, and the exchange of information with the security services of friendly countries."37 The
development of more advanced communications interception capabilities with the support
of other allied Western nations and in conjunction with appropriate safeguards for the
civil freedoms and security of the Jordanian people would be a significant contribution to
32. James Renwick, Counter-Terrorism andAustralianLaw, 3(3) SECURITY CHALLENGES 67, 71 (2007).
33. Id.
34. Simon Bronitt &James Stellios, Regulating Telecommunications Interception and Access in the Twenty-First
Century: Technological Evolution or Legal Revolution?, 24(4) PROMETHEUS 413, 424 (2006).
35. ANWAY AYASRAH, JORDAN STANDS AT THE FRONT LINE OF COMBATING TERRORISM 3 (Mar. 11,

2009) (unpublished Master's of Strategic Studies Degree Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College)
(on file with Dep't of Def. Reports).
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id. at 11.
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the multinational fight against terrorism. Recent public opinion surveys show substantial
support among the Jordanian populace for counter-terrorism activity and a high level of
38
trust in the existing intelligence and security agencies, laying a solid foundation for con39
structures.
law
enforcement
tinued development of advanced
B. THE BALANcING Acr
It is undisputed by any reasonable authority that modern nations need interception and
access capabilities to safeguard their national security, support law enforcement activities,
and protect economic activities. However, it has also always been a balancing act in a
democratic society, where the rights of individual citizens are also paramount. Some of
the recent counter-terrorism interception regulations have skirted dangerously close to
the edge (some would argue over the edge) of the line dividing national security from
fascism.
Golder and Williams argue that the speed with which some laws (such as the U.S.
Patriot Act) were enacted following 9/11 led to more aggressive abridgement of civil liberties. 40 By contrast, nations such as Australia and Canada took longer to consider and
refine new anti-terrorism legislative responses, with the resulting regulations ensuring
"greater protection secured for human rights and civil liberties."41 Most significantly,
Golder and Williams point out that counter-terrorism legislation, and ongoing refinements and amendments to said legislation, is now "very much an ongoing part of the
42
legislative programmes" of these countries. They provide examples of United States,
Australian, and British legislative action in recent years (not all of it ultimately passed) that
43
demonstrate how central this issue currently is to the national agenda of many countries.
Golder and Williams argue that:
"[The approach of domestic legislatures in enacting new laws on the subject of terrorism after September 11, 2001 has been to create new criminal sanctions and to
increase police and security intelligence organization powers in the pursuit of national security. This has been achieved at a cost to traditional civil liberties and
human rights principles in each of the nations and has placed some of the fundamental values and assumptions of each legal system under strain."44
In fact, Saito argues that the types of abridgements of privacy and the expanded investigatory and surveillance rights accorded to government agencies by the Patriot Act, though
framed as part of the national security debate, actually resemble most closely the types of
investigatory and surveillance activities traditionally used by governments to suppress dissent. 45 Thus the concern is that the Patriot Act represents a step down a pathway that will
38. NAWAF WASFI TELL, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, JORDAN, PUBLIC OPINION, TERRORISM AND
THE JORDANIAN SECURITY SECTOR 1-2 (2008), http://arab-reform.nettlMG/pdflArticle_-Nawaf~elTell.pdf.
39. Id. at 1-3.
40. Golder & Williams, supra note 26, at 45.
41. Id. at 45.
42. Id. at 46.
43. Id. at 45-48.
44. Id. at 47.
45. Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PatriotAct in the Context of COINTELPRO
and the Unlawfid Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REv. 1051, 1060 (2002).
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see further erosion of civil liberties, not only in the interest of counter-terrorism but for
baser political ends.
However, Sulmasy and Yoo argue that despite the apparently heavy-handed nature of

some aspects of the Patriot Act and FISA in practice the U.S. courts are striking the right
balance between national security interests and civil liberty. 46 They hold that "the lower
courts have reached the proper balance between constitutional rights and national security
by not requiring a warrant for national security searches. In fact, this is the only way to

view [FISA and the Patriot Act] as constitutional." 47 Rather than meeting the Constitution's warrant requirement, FISA orders simply follow the principle of "reasonableness" at
the core of the Fourth Amendment, thus "the courts have correctly distinguished between
48
domestic law enforcement activities and national security against foreign threats."
One unique tool at the disposal of U.K. anti-terrorism authorities is the extensive network of closed circuit surveillance cameras that virtually blanket many parts of the nation.
The use "of video surveillance by public authorities in public places has been subject to
considerable debate amongst privacy scholars who consider that the installation of the
extensive [network of cameras across the United Kingdom] has eroded individual privacy
and is leading to a 'big brother' state."49 There are currently no statutory regulations on
the use of these cameras, although the European Court of Human Rights appears to be
carefully monitoring and considering the matter.
By contrast, U.S. regulations treat "covert human surveillance (confidential informants),
directed surveillance (consensual interception of communications and lawful unplanned
surveillance), and video surveillance a bit differently: no special authorization is . .. required."o In fact, there are no restrictions in current U.S. law "on government surveillance within a public place. The limitations of [the] Fourth Amendment's proscription on

unreasonable searches and seizures only come into play when there is a justifiable expectation of privacy," 51 which is not deemed to apply to public places.
Interestingly, several experts on the law and civil liberties have made arguments that the
seeming dichotomy between civil liberty and counter-terrorism/national security is a false
one; that there are more balanced approaches that can incorporate both of these critical
principles without sacrificing one or the other. For example, Golder and Williams describe the positions of both the Canadian and Australian attorneys general that perhaps
there is a new approach focused on "human security" that recognizes terrorism as an essential breach of human rights, and thus integrated approaches to its prevention can serve
52
the aims of both national security and human freedom. As international thinking continues to evolve, and with increased multi-national cooperation to combat terrorism, perhaps more sophisticated and nuanced regulatory regimes will emerge from the debate.

46. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Katz and the War on Terrorism, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.1219, 1221 (2008).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1219.
49. FEIKERT & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 17.
50. Id. at 17-18.
51. Id. at 18.
52. Golder & Williams, supra note 26, at 51.
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Criminal Investigations

Since the early days of the telecommunications era, communication technology has provided both expanded communications capabilities alongside increased opportunities for
crime detection and prevention. In many ways criminal investigations and the "war on
drugs" parallel the demands of the "war on terror" for governments to conduct secretive
detection of widespread networks of illegal activity. Telecommunications interception offers modem law enforcement agencies a powerful set of tools for detection and investigation of criminal activity, if both the technical capabilities and the regulatory structures are
in place to provide effective administration of such a regime.
Looking at the current environment and into the future, Koops posits "technology has
an enormous enabling potential for solving crimes. But is does more than that. Technology opens up new horizons for information collection, and it enables monitoring, profiling, and predicting human behaviour, thus facilitating crime prevention alongside crime
repression in hitherto unknown ways."53 For example, Koops describes emerging location
data capabilities.54 Telecommunications networks are capable of "knowing" where a mobile phone is located, just as objects with global positioning system (GPS) capabilities
"know" their own location through satellite transmission.55 The potential for "(perceived)
security-enhancing measures like legislation for mandatory locatability of mobile phones
that call emergency numbers, or insurance companies mandating cars to be equipped with
tracers," may sound like futuristic crime stopping measures, but are likely only steps away
from the current systems.56
Even within today's law enforcement agencies, the capability for detecting and monitoring criminal activity using telecommunications interception and electronic technologies is
already yielding new results, as well as new regulatory and judicial questions. Nolin describes the long and successful history of wiretapping activity in breaking down and prosecuting organized criminal networks such as Columbian drug trafficking operations and the
Italian "mafia" families in the 1970s through the present day.5 7 However, he also points
out that organized crime is likewise taking advantage of new technologies to facilitate their
own activities, necessitating that law enforcement agencies keep pace with new
developments.58
For example, drug trafficking groups can make use of new technologies in two different
ways: "to improve the efficiency of product delivery and distribution through the medium
of secure, instant communications; and to protect themselves and their illicit operations
from investigation by drug law enforcement agencies."s9 New technologies give criminal
organizations additional tools; for example, they can "conceal information about the ship53. Bert-Jaap Koops, Technology and the Crime Society: Rethinking Legal Protection 93, 96 (TILT Law & Tech.
Working Paper No. 010/2009, 2009).
54. Id. at 97.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Christopher A. Nolin, Telecommunicationsas a Weapon in the War ofModern OrganizedCrime, 15 Comm.
LAW CONSPECTUS 231, 241 (2006).
58. Id. at 239-42.
59. Int'l Narcotics Control Bd., Globalizationand New Technologies: Challenges to Drug Law Enforcement in
the Twenty-First Century, 1 9, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2001/1 (2001), available at http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/ar/
2001/incbreport_2001 1.pdf.
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ment of illicit drug consignments by means of encrypted messages or to launder drugrelated funds by electronic transfer."60
With criminal organizations investing heavily in technology to circumvent detection,
law enforcement agencies found themselves struggling to keep up. 6 1 But in the United
States, the provisions of the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA) and its 2004 amendments have given law enforcement agencies the means to
fight back more effectively. 62 The intent of CALEA was "to make clear a telecommunications carrier's duty to cooperate in the interception of communications for law enforcement purposes, and for other purposes."63 In 2004, the U.S. Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) expanded CALEA provisions to incorporate the technical ability to
intercept and access Internet communications, including broadband telephony services,
such as voice over IP (VolP).64 These expanded interception and access capabilities have
enabled U.S. law enforcement to make significant inroads against organized crime
networks. 65
Additionally, CALEA has managed to sidestep many of the concerns surrounding the
Patriot Act and other terrorism-specific legislation regarding overstepping civil liberties. 66
As Nolin explains, CALEA benefits "from clearly-defined and publicly available guidelines
and constraints" that are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 67 Additionally,
CALEA's "notion of reasonableness is considerably more evident with regard to the practice of electronic surveillance," and thus is well calibrated. 68 Finally, Nolin contends that
"the balance inherent in CALEA's goals of promoting fair competition, encouraging innovation, and protecting public safety and national security" are more clearly expressed
and exemplified in its provisions, providing for "unique cooperation between law enforcement and business as working pursuant to mutual agreement."69
In the United Kingdom, RIPA provisions govern the interception of information related to criminal activity and likewise information related to terrorist activity. 70 The British experience with using interception in criminal investigations, like the U.S. experience,
has been largely positive. 7 ' One British investigative authority describes the benefits of
using interception as a criminal investigative tool:
* It carries very low risk of putting police officers in danger or warning the suspect of
police interest in him;
60. Id.
61. Nolin, supra note 57, at 240-42.
62. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2010).
63. Id.
64. Constance L. Martin, ExaltedTechnology: Should CALEA Be Erpanded to Authorize Internet Wiretapping?,
32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 140, 150 (2005).
65. Ryan Singel, Point, Click ... Eavesdrop: How the FBI Wiretap Net Operates,WIRED, Aug, 29, 2007, http:/
/www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/08/wiretap?currentPage=all>.
66. See, e.g., Heena Musabji & Christina Abraham, The Threat to Civil Liberties and its Effects on Muslims in
America, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR Soc. JUST. 83, 83-84 (2007).
67. Nolin, supra note 57, at 259.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, §§ 1-2 (Eng.).
71. HOME DEPARTMENT, PRIVY COUNCIL REVIEW OF INTERCEPT As EVIDENCE, REPORT, 2008-1,

PARL. CM7324,

f1[

16-17 (U.K.) [hereinafter HOME DEPARTMENT].
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* It is flexible and uniquely easy to put in place quickly;
* It is less costly and less intrusive than for example covert entry, surveillance or
eavesdropping;
* It can help ensure the safety of law enforcement personnel; and
* It can provide excellent intelligence of criminals' plans, allowing law enforcement
to prevent serious crimes from occurring as well as to collect evidence of crimes
72
being committed.
Interception activities in Britain, as in the United States, have led to a significant number of arrests and recoveries of firearms, drugs, and cash, making it one of the most valuable tools in the crime-fighting arsenal."3 Likewise, the Australian experience with using
telecommunications interception as a criminal investigative tool has proven to be positive,
leading to thousands of arrests and prosecutions. 74 A report on the use of intercepted
information by Australian law enforcement further showed that not only did the intercepted information contribute to successful investigation and prosecution but it often led
suspects to plead guilty, 75 thus saving the state the time and expense of a court trial prior
to the incarceration of a criminal.76

V.

Evidence

Beyond all of the questions addressed in various regulatory regimes of what materials
can be intercepted and under what conditions, it is important to look at the issue of the
actual use of intercepted materials in criminal prosecutions. Intercepted materials have
several uses, including for the investigation and detection of crimes or terrorist activity.77
But also, when perpetrators of those acts are brought to trial, intercepted materials can be
relevant to establishing and proving a case against the accused and thus lead to the successful prosecution and imprisonment of criminals or terrorists.78 But the issue is
complex.
Some interception regimes do not allow information obtained through an interception
to be used directly as evidence in legal proceedings.79 Intercepted information is allowed
to be used only for the purposes of furthering an investigation, such as leading law enforcement to additional criminal activity.80 Walden explains that
[tihe primary justification given for such a stance is to protect from disclosure information about the investigative activities of law enforcement agencies, as such activities would enter the public domain if intercept evidence was used in court and
became subject to challenge by a defendant's counsel. Rendering the product of in72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.

32.

Id. 1 175-77.
Id. $$ 155-56.
Id. 155.
Id.
See, e.g., USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §816, 115 Stat. 272, 385 (2001).
United States v. Ning Wen, 477 F.3d 896, 897 (7th Cir. 2006).
See, e.g., HOME DEPARTMENr, supra note 71, at $ 175.
Ian Walden, Crime and Security in Cyberspace, 18 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT'L AFF. 51, 62 (2005).
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terception inadmissible also effectively operates as a disincentive to interception
activity. 8 '
Although the indirect (and perhaps unintended) effect of this prohibition is that it also
keeps personal information included within an intercepted communication from being
made public in a court of law, thus alleviating some privacy concerns, Walden goes on to
explain that "historically, national legal systems have distinguished between the interception of the content of communications and the traffic data related to the communication
session itself, such as the number called." 82 For example, police will often obtain the
telephone traffic data for a suspect's calls and are then free to interrogate the suspect as to
the nature and substance of specific calls to specific parties (information that the suspect is
free to refuse to provide, if he/she so chooses under various constitutional protections
against self-incrimination, such as those in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution).83

A.

TmE U.S. EVIDENTIARY REGIME, POST 9/11

In the United States there are different regulations governing the collection of data for
national security investigations, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
as opposed to use of data in courts.84 As discussed in section IV, the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution provides the philosophical framework for the collection and use
of evidence in the U.S. justice system.85 The Fourth Amendment sets forth the important
principle that citizens have the right to certain protection of their persons and property
from "unreasonable search and seizure" of evidence, which has been designated by U.S.
86
courts to include collection of evidence through interception and access.
Yet, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the
Patriot Act and other subsequent legislative and executive acts have broadened national
security, counter-terrorism interception, and data collection capabilities well beyond what
87
was traditionally allowed for standard criminal prosecutions in U.S. courts. As Hall
explains,
[p]robable cause [for issuing a warrant] under Tide III requires substantial evidence
to believe that the target has, is, or is about to commit a listed predicate offense. In
contrast, for FISA, electronic surveillance requires probable cause that the target is a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power. 8
81. Id.
82. Id.
8 3. Id.
84. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006); Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2010).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
86. Id.
87. Matthew R. Hall, ConstitutionalRegulation of National Security Investigation:Minimizing the Use of Unrelated Evidence, 41 WAKE FoREs-r L. REv. 61, 95-96 (2006).
88. Id. at 81.
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Likewise, a surveillance warrant under Title m can be valid for up to thirty days but
under FISA it can be ninety days. 89 These are just two examples of multiple points upon
which the procedures and requirements for telecommunications interception and evidence
gathering differ between Title M and FISA.90
These differences derive to some extent from the inherent difference between standard
criminal investigation and prosecution, versus the broader needs for government to be
able to investigate, anticipate, and protect its citizens from terrorism and other national
security threats.9 1 But in day-to-day practice, these differences present challenges. For,
example, evidence collected as part of an investigation under FISA may not be admissible
in court to prosecute an offender. 92 U.S. policymakers have attempted to reconcile these
differences and provide guidance to law enforcement and national security agencies with
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR).93 The result of FISCR is
that "virtually no distinction exists between criminal law enforcement and intelligence. So
long as the investigation includes a significant foreign intelligence collection purpose, it
may also fully embrace the collection of evidence for prosecution."9 4 As Hall points out,
"[u]nder this approach, FISA will consume the normal Fourth Amendment process ... for
a significant swath of counterterrorism investigation and enforcement activity."95 This
erosion of citizen protection under the Fourth Amendment is troubling to many civil
libertarians and constitutional experts. 96

B.

THE BRITISH EVIDENTIARY REGIME

In the British system, the gulf between national security and criminal investigations is
not so great. The U.S. and British approaches to the matter of wiretapping can be seen to
rest on a basic philosophical difference between the "values" of each nation, as Saperstein
characterizes it.97 He describes the difference as "an important dichotomy between dignity, which is more valued by [sic] Europe, and liberty, which is more treasured by the
United States,"9 8 and thus, British laws reflect a firmer stance on the matter of protecting
the privacy of individuals. British and other European laws, to some extent, do appear to
be oriented more towards preventing the large-scale use of data (such as the NSA's warrantless wiretapping program), and are rather less strict with regards to specific one-time
national security evidence gathering activities for the purposes of specific investigation.99
U.S. laws are more concerned with preventing an "invasion" of personal privacy by wire89. Id. at 83.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 80-84.
92. Beryl A. Howell & Dana J. Lesemann, FISA's Fruits in Criminal Cases: An Opportunity for Improved
Accountability, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 145, 146-47, 150-51, 153 (2007).

93. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2010).
94. Hall, supra note 87, at 98-99.
95. Id. at 99.
96. J. Christopher Champion, The Revamped FISA: Striking a Better Balance Between the Government's Need
to Protect Itself and the 4th Amendment, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1671, 1691-92 (2005).
97. Daniel Saperstein, The European Counterterroristas the Next U.S. Cold Warrior: Why the United States
Should Select from the German and British Models of Procedure, Evidence, and Oversight for National Security
Wiretapping, 32 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1952, 1965 (2009).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1966-67.

VOL. 45, NO. 3

THE REASONABLE NECESSARY

873

tapping, while the European approach has more strictures to prevent an ongoing use of
data that would compromise personal dignity. 00
Saperstein also points out another key distinction that underlies the British and U.S.
interception systems, and that is the differing focus of each country's respective investigative agency as another distinction underlying the British and U.S. interception systems."ot
Whereas the British MI-5 and MI-6 (the primary organizations for international security,
counter-terrorism, and criminal investigation matters, analogous to the CIA and FBI) are
keenly focused on prevention of terrorism, the FBI's mission tends to skew more towards a
strict criminal mindset: "arrest, conviction, and sentencing."10 2 Accordingly, the British
regulatory regime under the current Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) in03
cludes a degree of oversight to ensure proper application of interception activities.
"MI-5 and MI-6 are subject to ministerial, parliamentary, and judicial review in cases of
improper electronic surveillance,"04 including a commissioner and a tribunal whose re05
sponsibilities are the review of interception warrants and activities.
The British regulatory regime differs from the U.S. regime in another significant way:
there is considered to be a general ban on the use of intercepted materials in court prosecutions, with evidence allowed only based on a set of prescribed exceptions as approved by
the courts. 0 6 However, there is a "tension" built into the current structure that British
policymakers have yet to address."o7 As Tomkins describes, the role of the prosecutors in
British courts is divided: they are responsible for determining which evidence may be
presented in a case, while also having the role of arguing that case to bring about fair
justice. 08 Tomkins advocates for removing the prosecutor's responsibility for determining evidentiary inclusion from the prosecutors.10 9
C.

THE AUSTRALiAN EVIDENTIARY REGIME

In Australia, telecommunications interception is regulated by the Telecommunications
(Interception) Act 1979.110 The Act distinguishes between national security warrants and
law enforcement warrants and sets forth specific procedures and requirements for each."'
"Lawfully intercepted information is admissible as evidence in exempt proceedings or defined circumstances or for permitted purposes."ll 2 By addressing both types of investigatory uses of telecommunications interception and access within one act, distinctions can
100. Id. at 1965-67.
101. Id. at 1970-74.
102. Saperstein, supra note 97, at 1972-73.
103. Id. at 1979.
104. Id. at 1979.
105. Id. at 1979-80.
106. HOME DEPARTMENT, supra note 71, at 9120.
107. Adam Tomkins, Intercepted Evidence: Now You Hear Me, Now You Don't, 57 MOD. L. REv. 941, 944
(1994) (U.K.).
108. Id. at 944-46.
109. Id. at 951-54.
110. See generally Telecommunications Act 1979 (Cth) (Austl.).
111. See id. at §§ 9, 11.
112. THOMAS WONG, RESEARCH & LIBRARY SERV. DivisioN LEGIS. COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, RPO2/0405, REGULATION OF INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS

IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS

914

(2005)

(H.K.).
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be made clearer and specific procedures and exceptions can be addressed with greater
consistency; an approach recommended for development of any new regulatory regime.
D.

MULTINATIONAL EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND COOPERATION

One challenge regarding telecommunications interception is that often-especially in
matters of national security-telephone calls and other communications cross international
boundaries.113 This points out one further complication regarding the collection and use
of intercepted materials as evidence: when material is collected according to the appropriate regulatory regime of one nation and is used as evidence in prosecutions in the courts of
another nation with a different regulatory regime.114 As Saperstein points out, "[tihe War
on Terror is not limited to the United States, but rather, requires the cooperation and
dedication of European allies" around the globe.115 But such multinational cooperative
efforts must be conducted carefully so as not to result in what Nelson terms an "end-run
around the Fourth Amendment." 1 6 As Nelson explains, "the Fourth Amendment protects Americans within the borders of the United States, but its applicability outside
American territory is less clear." 17 British legal authorities are required to comply with
the broader European Convention on Human Rights that to some extent helps promote
cross-border admissibility of evidence collected by other European Union govern118
National and international regulatory and judicial bodies continue to grapple
ments.
with the admissibility of evidence within a nation's own courts, especially where that evi-

dence may have been collected outside of the jurisdiction of the country's laws, or using a
different set of standards.119

VI.

Economic Perspectives

In the increasingly internet-connected global economy, it is crucial for consumers and
citizens of every nation to have confidence in the security of the information they transmit
and communicate via various electronic media, including telephone land lines, cell phones,
email, websites, wireless computers, and communications devices, such as "smart phones,"

20
laptops, text messages, instant messaging, and more.1 In this regard, "security" of the
information includes both security from unlawful access by criminals who would use personal or business information in a manner that would harm the individual or the company,

113. Richard W. Downing, Shoring Up the Weakest Link: What LawmakersAround the World Need to Consider
in Developing Comprehensive Laws to Combat Cybercrime, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 705, 719 (2005).
114. Kristopher A. Nelson, Transnational Wiretaps and the Fourth Amendment, 36 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q.
329, 351 (2009).
115. Saperstein, supra note 97, at 1953.
116. Nelson, supra note 114, at 351.
117. Id. at 330.
118. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 005.
119. See, e.g., Why Intercept Evidence Should Be Admissible in Criminal Proceedings, SoCIETY OF CONSERVATIVE LAWYERS, http://www.conservativelawyers.com/assets/uploads/publications/pdf/Intercept-evidence.pdf
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (U.K).
120. ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERY, SECUREY AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 3 (May 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/

files/rss-viewer/intemational-strategy for..cyberspace.pdf
CYBERSPACE].

VOL. 45, NO. 3

[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL

STRATEGY FOR

THE REASONABLE NECESSARY

875

as well as security of the information from burdensome or intrusive government monitoring and interference.1 21
There is a direct threat posed by criminals who would make use of electronic information-activities known as "cybercrime" and "identity theft"-as well as terrorists whose
method of attack is not with explosions or violence, but through infiltration and damage
to the institutions and financial infrastructures of the world's economies as a means to
destabilize society.122 Methods such as encryption of information are used to help protect
electronic data and communications from these types of attacks.123 However, encryption
and data security also pose a barrier that law enforcement and national security agencies
24
now need to contend with when conducting interception and access activities.1
The previous section explored the difficult balancing act between law enforcement, national security concerns, and the civil liberties and privacy concerns of a nation's citizens.
Likewise, there is a similar balancing act in the economic realm between protection of
economic and personal data and the accessibility of that data, as it may be relevant for law
enforcement and national security protection, versus the need to allow information to flow
freely to facilitate the economic activity critical to a nation's financial well-being that will
allow a nation such asJordan to fully participate in the global economy.125 Threats to the
economic security of a nation do not come only from the impact of criminal or terrorist
activity but to some degree can arise from the very telecommunications regulations and
interception activities that are designed to protect financial systems, due to the potentially
dampening effect those activities may have on electronic financial transactions and the
sharing of data to facilitate economic activity.126 This balancing act and some of the economic implications of telecommunications interception will be examined in the next
section.
A.

GROWTH OF TELECOMMUNICATIONs Ac'rivrry

IN

GLOBAL ECONOM\IES

Part of the challenge for any government in effectively managing and responding to
telecommunications is the rapid pace of technological change and the need for regulatory
regimes to be flexible and continually adapt to new electronic communications modalities.127 As Lewis says, "[t]he technological improvements that made communications
technologies better and cheaper can also make interception more difficult. These improvements included the use of fiber optics, packet switching, strong commercial encryp28
tion, and the spread of Voice over Internet Protocol ("VolP")."
When interception activities first came into practice roughly a century ago, the only
private communications media were telephones (land-based); thus technologies such as
121. Id.
122. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32114, BoTNrrs, CYBERCRIME, & CYBERTERRORISM:
VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1, 10-12 (2008).

123. Andrew Yung, Regulating the Genie: Effective Wiretaps in the Information Age, 101 DICK. L. REv. 95,
109-11 (1996).
124. Id. at 110-11.
125. Downing, supra note 113, at 743-44.

126. Id. at 743.
127. Id. at 715.
128. James A. Lewis, New Objectivesfor CFIUS: Foreign Ownersbip, CriticalInfrastructure,and Communications
Interception, 57 FED. Comm. L.J. 457, 459 (2005).
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wiretapping and "PEN" traces were all that law enforcement needed to obtain valuable
information from interception. 129 Today, the majority of economic activity conducted
around the globe depends on electronic communications networks, from satellite transmissions, online banking and funds transfers, stock market transactions, internet e-commerce retail sales, and point-of-sale use of debit and credit cards, to email
communications, cell phone communications, Skype, and similar internet "phone" services, text messages, and 3G networks that facilitate the flow of personal communications
and business activity across state lines and national borders.130
Deregulation of the communications industries in many countries has reduced the
number of government-controlled and monopoly telecommunications providers, and thus
increased the number of service providers.is3 These changes have been accompanied in
recent decades with a vast increase in the volume of electronic communications traffic. 132
"The profusion of services, technologies, and service providers also complicates interception efforts. The economic benefit of these changes clearly outweighs the cost to law
enforcement and intelligence" 133 but the complicated global consumer and business communications environment now presents new challenges for government interception
regulators.i34

B.

IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION INTERCEPTION FOR PROTECTING ECONOMIC
GROWTH

The economic health of national and international financial systems actually faces two

distinct threats: electronic criminal activity (cybercrime) and electronic terrorism activity
(cyber terrorism). 135 Because criminal and terrorist activities can now be conducted entirely through electronic means over the telecommunications networks of the world, it is
even more important for governments to have the means of detecting, preventing, capturing, and prosecuting cybercriminals and cyber terrorists. Interception and access capabilities are imperative as a means to stop those individuals and organizations that would use
these networks as the platform to conduct their activities.' 36
Protecting the communications platforms from attacks has also become a matter of critical national and economic security.1 37 For example, the United States has defined infor129. See CDT's Analysis of S. 2092: Amending the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute in Response to Recent
InternetDenial of Service Attacks and to Establish Meaningful Privacy Protections, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECHNOLOGY, Apr. 4, 2000, http://old.cdt.org/security/000404amending.shtml.
130. Robert Crandall, William Lehr, & Robert Litan, The Effects of Broadband Deployment on Output and
Employment: A Cross-SectionalAnalysis of U.S. Data, 6 IssuEs IN ECON. POL'Y 1 (June 2007), availableat http:/
/www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/061abor-crandall.aspx.
131. Lewis, supra note 128, at 459.

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 459-63.
135. WILSON, supra note 122, at 4.
136. CARNiVoRE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL BEFORE THE S. COAMM.ON THE JUDICIARY, 106th Cong. 1-4 (2000)
(statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, FBI), available at http://www.au.af
millaulawc/awcgate/fbi/carnivore-tool.html.

137. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 120, at 19.
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38
mation infrastructure as a critical cornerstone of national security.1 In fact, the U.S.
Defense Department identified the security of information systems (not the security of the
nation's physical borders) as the primary concern for current and future national security:
"[olur response to information warfare threats to the United States may present the greatest challenge in preparing for the security environment of 2010-2020."139 The panel additionally says that

Information systems are rapidly becoming the key components of the nation's infrastructure. At the same time, our competitors will likely redouble their efforts to use
our increasing dependence on information systems against us. The potential for an
enemy to use attacks on information infrastructures as a means of undermining our
economy and deterring or disrupting our operations abroad is of increasing concern.
As the threats to commercial and defense information networks increase, the defense
of our information infrastructure becomes crucial. The Department of Defense's reliance on the global commercial telecommunications infrastructure further complicates the equation."
A nation's electronic communications networks and infrastructure are critical for ongoing economic health and development for several reasons:
* Critical financial and electronic infrastructure must be secure from intrusion or
attack that would bring business or governmental functions to a halt.
* Consumers and businesses must have confidence in the security of financial institutions, such as banks.
* Consumers and businesses must have confidence in the security of financial, business, competitive, and trade secret information that may be stored on or transmitted via electronic networks (e.g., cell phone conversations and emails).141
Telecommunications and electronic interception and access are critical tools for being
42
able to protect these activities of a nation's economic and "life support" systems.1
C.

FoREIGN INVESTMENT & OWNERSHIP

In addition to the security threats discussed, another area of potential concern for any
nation is the increasingly interconnected global nature of the communications networks
43
upon which world economies depend, and the question of who controls those networks.1
For example, the United States is particularly concerned with the potential threats posed
by foreign ownership of telecommunications networks and any potential conflicts this
might engender.144 The United States is currently the largest foreign direct investor in
138. NAT'L DEF. PANEL, TRANSFORMING DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE
(1997), http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/administration-andManagement/other/902.pdf.
139. Id.

21ST CENTURY

27

140. Id.
141. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 120, at 3.

142. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY AcT: GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVES ON PROTECTING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 112th Cong. 2 (2011)
(statement of James A. Baker, Associate Deputy Att'y Gen.).
143. Lewis, supra note 128, at 459-63.

144. Id. at 462-63.
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the businesses of other nations in the world while also being the single largest recipient of
foreign direct investment from other countries. 145 As Jackson explains, "[t]his dual role
means that globalization, or the spread of economic activity by firms across national borders, has become a prominent feature of the U.S. economy and that through direct investment the U.S. economy has become highly enmeshed with the broader global
economy."I46
In particular, U.S. authorities are concerned with maintaining their ability to conduct
interception activities in cooperation with foreign-owned firms. 1 4 7 As Lewis describes,
[w]hile foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies are almost always harmless, there has
always been concern among federal officials that foreign ownership could multiply
opportunities for espionage, make defenders' tasks more complex, and reduce law
enforcement communications interception capabilities. A new concern is that foreign
acquisitions are a new avenue for a potential opponent to disrupt critical infrastructure and the services.148
Accordingly, the United States created the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) process in 1988 as part of a broader trade liberalization policy to
review the potential national security implications of foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms.-49
CFIUS also reflects a broader effort in the United States to maintain the security of communications networks, and in particular, to maintain also the necessary national security
and law enforcement interception capabilities.150
D.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REGULATORY REGIMES

As mentioned above, the regulatory regimes themselves can have an impact on economic activity; these potential impacts must be considered as well. One of the economic
considerations is the impact on businesses of complying with provisions of any regulations.15 For example, the Patriot Act in the United States, with its far-reaching antiterrorism objectives, incorporated provisions that impact multiple sectors of industry and
organizational activities.1 52 As outlined by Carrigan, Alex, and Ward, the cable industry
(that provides a large portion of high-speed internet access services) has been impacted by
the records retention requirements of the Patriot Act, necessitating new policies, data
storage, and even additional staff members to manage compliance with the new requirements.153 Carrigan, Alex, and Ward go on to describe how "the records retention require145. JAMES A. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34561, FOREIGN INVESTMENTr AND NATIONAL SECURITY: EcoNOMIC CONSIDERATIONS Sununary (2008).

146. Id.
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151. Jeffrey J. Polich, Judicial Review and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement FairnessAct: An Early
Eraminationof When and Where Judges are Using Their Newly GrantedPower over FederalRegulatory Agencies, 41
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1425, 1431-32 (2000).
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ments that are now required under The Patriot Act has not only caused businesses to add
more employees and to spend more money on training, but some businesses have had to
develop entirely new departments to adhere to these changes."154 Thus the Patriot Act
has placed an economic burden on companies by increasing their operating costs and to
some extent decreasing their competitiveness and ability to invest that money in other
business growth activities. 55
VII.

Conclusion

It is important for developed nations to have the means and structures in place to allow
for appropriate safeguards of national security and the investigation and prosecution of
56
In particular, a
criminals, both as a matter of national security and economic security.
nation such as Jordan, located in a highly sensitive region of the globe, is in a position
both to benefit from and contribute to cooperative multinational anti-terrorism activities,
including telecommunications interception. Electronic surveillance is increasingly critical
in national security, counter-terrorism, and law enforcement activities both as a means to
57
detect and prevent illegal activity and as a means to protect critical infrastructure.
But at the same time, it is also critical for policies and regulations of telecommunications interception and access to not be too heavy-handed, such that they invade citizens'
or businesses' civil liberties and freedoms, or place an undue burden to an extent that
dampens economic development, constrains business activities, and inhibits the flourishing of socio-economic conditions for a developing nation.158 As we can see from the
examples of countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, regulating telecommunications interception and access is a delicate balancing act, and one
that must be continually revisited and refined, as well as monitored rigorously with appropriate safeguards, to ensure the effective yet just application of the laws.
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